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1 Introduction
Part-time work is often confused with flexible labor and inferior labor standards. How-
ever, the main difference between part-time jobs and flexible jobs is that part-time jobs
provide flexibility to the employer and job protection to the workers while flexible jobs
provide flexibility to the employer and insecurity to the worker. Part-time jobs provide
flexibility to the employer in terms of allocating hours of work across the workweek or
workday to meet peaks in market demand. Part-time jobs provide flexibility to the worker
in terms of allocating hours of work across the workweek to better coordinate work and
personal activities. A part-timer can have a temporary contract or a permanent contract.
There are quite substantial cross-country differences in the nature of part-time work.
There is a negative cross-country relationship between the share of women working part-
time and the share of involuntary part-timers. This negative relationship may seem counter-
intuitive but it is not because the quality of the part-time job in the intermittent variable.
Although typically part-timers enjoy less favorable employment conditions these are not
embedded in part-time jobs. The higher the share of part-timers the stronger is their
bargaining position. If the share of part-timers increases, the quality of part-time em-
ployment increases as well (see also Boeri and van Ours, 2013). Therefore, whether or
not a part-time job is an inferior job also depends on whether part-time jobs are a rare
phenomenon.
It is not the case that part-time jobs offer intrinsically less job stability to the in-
dividual worker although in many countries part-time work and job instability are cor-
related. Blázquez Cuesta and Moral Carcedo (2014) study labor market transitions in
Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Italy and Spain, using data from the European Com-
munity Household Panel (1995-2001). They find that part-timers are more likely to make
a transition to non-employment than full-timers in four of the five countries. However, in
the Netherlands transition rates from employment to non-employment are very similar for
part-timers and full-timers. So, also in terms of job stability, the position of part-timers is
clearly country-specific.
Part-time work is not equally distributed across the working age population. Sal-
ladarré and Hlaimi (2014) study the determinants of female part-time employment in 23
European countries using Round 5 of the European Social Survey (2010-11). They distin-
guish between long part-time work (20-29 hours per week) and short part-time work (less
than 20 hours per week) finding that cross-country the two types of part-time work tend
to be complementary. Furthermore, they show that short part-time jobs are more common
among women in the youngest and the oldest age groups, among those suffering from a
slight injury, those with a larger number of children and those with less education and
2
training.
Part-time work is not only associated with job instability but also with lower pay
and fewer opportunities to make a career. Connolly and Gregory (2009) for example
study part-time pay penalties of British women from a long-term perspective. For this,
they analyze the British New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset using data from a 27-year
unbalanced panel which records the earnings, working hours and occupations. They find
that part-time work in itself has a small pay penalty, but part-time work causes women
to follow a different career path with lower earnings throughout the remainder of their
working life. It is this lower earnings trajectory which damages earnings of women rather
than the part-time work itself. Women who want to work fewer hours are often forced
to achieve this by changing employers and accept a downgraded job. The authors also
find that the earnings damage of working part-time for a while is not removed if later on
women go back to full-time jobs. The authors also mention a possible explanation for the
direct part-time pay penalty. Part-time jobs are more expensive for employers because
of the fixed labor costs which are spread out over fewer working hours. If this is not
balanced by reduced labor costs related to organizational flexibility to meet fluctuations
in demand hourly wages have to go down in order for employers to make it profitable to
create part-time jobs.1
Whether indeed part-time workers are less productive than full-time workers is not
clear and may depend on the nature of the job. Künn-Nelen et al. (2013) is a rare example
of a study on the productivity of part-time workers. They analyze data for the Dutch
pharmacy sector finding that firms with a large part-time employment share are more
productive than firms with a large share of full-time workers. The main reason is that
firms with a large share of part-timers are able to allocate their workers more efficiently
across working days. The authors find that part-time workers are not more productive
than full-time workers at the individual level, i.e. in the hours they work they are equally
productive. The allocation efficiency related to part-time workers has three sources. First,
pharmacies are open around 50 hours a week whereas the full-time working week counts
36 hours. Therefore, allocating part-timers across the workweek increases efficiency.
Second, part-timers can be used such that the pharmacies can remain open during lunch
breaks of full-timers. Finally, part-timers may be used during parts of the day when there
are peaks in consumer demand.
One of the reasons suggested for part-time workers to have less opportunities to make
a career is that they are less likely to receive employer-sponsored training (Bassanini et
1Connolly and Gregory (2009) conclude that the socially and personally efficient outcome would be
part-time jobs as reduced hours versions of full-time jobs, avoiding occupational downgrading. As we
discuss in more detail in Section 2, this is the situation in the Netherlands.
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al., 2005; Blundell et al., 1996). Therefore, their productivity does not increase as much
as it would have increased otherwise.
Our paper is on the extent to which part-time workers in the Netherlands receive firm-
sponsored training. In our analysis we make a distinction between part-time working
women and men. As far as we know, Backes-Gellner et al. (2014) is the only study that
investigates gender-specific differences in the relationship between part-time employment
and firm-sponsored training. Analyzing Swiss data the authors find that female workers
are less likely to receive firm-sponsored training than male workers. However, there is
also a part-time effect with part-timers being less likely to receive training than full-timers.
This part-time training gap appears to be gender-specific. Whereas women working part-
time have a similar training incidence as full-time working women, part-time working
men are less likely to be trained than full-time working men. The authors argue that their
findings may be due to stereotyping where employers think that men who work part-time
signal a lower attachment to their job.
We present an empirical analysis of the relationship between hours of work and firm-
sponsored training. We show that the negative effect of part-time work on the probability
to receive employer-sponsored training holds for male workers but not for female workers.
Whereas male part-time workers are less likely to receive training, part-time working
women are as likely to receive training as full-time working women. We cannot rule
out the possibility of gender-working hours specific monopsony power but speculate that
the gender-specific effect of working hours on training has to do with gender-specific
stereotyping. In the Netherlands, for women it is common to work part-time. More than
half of the prime age female employees work part-time. Among younger and older female
workers the share of part-timers is even higher. On the contrary for males, working part-
time is a rare event. Except for younger and older men, the share of part-timers is below
10%. So, part-time working men are rare breed. Therefore, because of social norms, men
working part-time could send a different signal to their employer than women working
part-time. This might generate a different propensity of firms to sponsor training of male
part-timers than female part-timers. Nevertheless, this different propensity may also have
to do with firms having more monopsony power over part-time working women than they
have of part-time working men. This would allow them to reap some of the productivity-
related benefits of the training of part-time working women.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, as far as we know, our paper is the
first one to use panel data to study whether there are gender-specific differences in the
relationship between part-time work and training. Backes-Gellner et al. (2014) for exam-
ple use cross-sectional data and therefore their identification strategy relies on observed
characteristics. Our panel data allow us to take unobserved individual characteristics into
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account and exploit the longitudinal dimension to further relax the strict exogeneity as-
sumption implied by fixed effects estimators. Second, we study data from a country with
a high share of part-time workers. This allows us to study the relationship between part-
time work and training in great detail.
Our paper is set up as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional set-up of the
Dutch labor market with respect to the use of part-time work. Section 3 describes the data
and the sample used in the empirical investigation. Section 4 formalizes the econometric
model and clarifies the identification strategy. The estimation results are presented and
discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Part-time employment in the Netherlands
As shown in the top graph of Figure 1, among prime age employed female workers in the
Netherlands, the share of part-timers is very high. It is about 55% and quite stable over the
time period 2000-2013. The OECD average for female workers is a little over 20%. For
male prime age workers, the share of part-timers in the Netherlands is not very different
from the OECD average and far below the share of female part-timers. Over the period
2000-2013, there is a slight increase but the shares are still substantially below 10%.
The bottom graph of Figure 1 shows the prevalence of part-time work by age category
for the Netherlands and the average of the OECD countries. The patterns are very similar
but the levels are substantially different. Prevalence of part-time work is highest among
youngsters and older workers. Whereas in the age group 15-19 years the prevalence of
part-time work is more than 90% among Dutch female workers, it is ‘only’ about 60%
on average for female workers in OECD countries. Among male workers aged 15-19,
the incidence of part-time work in the Netherlands is about 80% whereas on average in
OECD countries it is about 40%.
Although part-time work makes it possible for young mothers to combine work and
care, part-time jobs are not exclusively for young mothers. In the Netherlands, currently
almost half of the part-time working women are over 40 years of age and no longer have
young children. About 40% of women with part-time jobs are mothers of young children
who work part-time because they either prefer this or have no choice but to provide child-
care themselves. A little over 10% of women with part-time jobs are mothers with older
children (Booth and van Ours, 2013).
One of the reasons for part-time work being popular in the Netherlands is that part-
time jobs are not inferior to full-time jobs in terms of the nature of the work and social
security arrangements such as unemployment insurance, disability benefits, pension ben-
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FIGURE 1: PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS AND OECD
A: PRIME AGE (25-54); 2000-2013
B: BY AGE GROUP; 2013
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics; a part-time job has a working week of less than 30 hours.
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efits and minimum wage. By and large, part-time jobs only differ in terms of working
hours from full-time jobs. Originally, in the 1950s part-time jobs were introduced for
married women in response to shortages of young female staff (Portegijs et al., 2006).
When part-time jobs became more popular, changes in labor regulations were introduced
which further stimulated their popularity.2 In 1993, for example, the statutory exemption
of jobs of less than one-third of the normal working week from application of the legal
minimum wage and related social security entitlements were abolished. So part-timers
have the same social security arrangements and minimum wage as full-timers. In 2000, a
right to part-time work law was introduced.
In the meantime, part-time jobs are so popular among Dutch women that on average
many women who work in “large” part-time jobs prefer to work shorter hours. According
to Portegijs et al. (2006), a part-time job between 20 and 27 hours a week is the preferred
choice of many women.3 Indeed, using data on preferred working hours, Booth and
van Ours (2013) calculated the number of hours at which there is an equilibrium in the
sense that the number of individuals wanting to work more is as large as the number of
individuals wanting to work less. For women, the equilibrium number of weekly working
hours is about 21, while for men, it is about 32.
Part-time jobs are not only popular among Dutch women. Also some employers have
a preference for part-time labor as it provides them with organizational flexibility i.e. it
allows them to vary labor input if market demand fluctuates over the week like, in retailing
(Euwals and Hogerbrugge, 2006). Bosch et al. (2010) find that the incidence of part-time
work has increased over successive generations at the expense of full-time and small part-
time jobs. As a result, the average working hours of working women remained stable over
successive cohorts. Bosch and van der Klaauw (2012) analyze the effects of a 2001 tax
reform which made work much more financially attractive for women with a high-income
partner. Nevertheless, they find that women actually reduced their working hours slightly
in response to receiving a higher after-tax hourly wage.
2According to Portegijs et al. (2006), the Netherlands and Sweden have a policy aiming to make part-
time work more attractive to workers unlike countries like Spain, the UK, Germany and France, where
governments aim to make part-time work more attractive for employers.
3There is no uniform definition of part-time work. In OECD-statistics, a part-time job is a job less than
30 hours per week (van Bastelaer et al., 1997). Statistics Netherlands defines jobs of 12-19 hours per week
as small part-time jobs and job of 20-34 hours per week as large part-time jobs. From 35 hours per week
onwards, jobs are full-time jobs.
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3 Data Description
The data used in this paper are from a new Dutch panel, the Longitudinal Internet Studies
for the Social Sciences (LISS) panel. The LISS panel is collected and administered by
CentERdata of Tilburg University. A representative sample of households is drawn from
a population register by Statistics Netherlands and asked to join the panel by Internet
interviewing. Households are provided with a computer and/or an Internet connection if
they do not have one.4 The LISS panel is made up of several study units. Different study
units can have different timings and frequency over the year in data collection. Some
background information on general characteristics, like demography, family composition,
education, labor market position and earnings, is measured on a monthly basis, from
November 2007 until October 2015 (at the time of writing). Ten core studies are instead
carried out once a year and cover a wide set of topics, like health, religion and ethnicity,
social integration and leisure, family and household, work and schooling, personality,
politics and economic situation.5 For this study we exploit the monthly information of the
background variables and the core study on work and schooling, which was carried out
mostly in April from 2008 until 2014.6 The core study on work and education comprises
a broad range of questions about labor market participation, job characteristics, pensions,
schooling and training. People are asked whether they attended work-related training
courses in the last 12 months and, if so, who sponsored the training course. People are also
asked whether they are at work at the moment of the interview and if they are employees,
the type of contract if employed and the type of non-employment status if not working.
Between 5,358 and 6,951 individuals were interviewed each year for the core study
on work and schooling between 2008 and 2014, resulting in a total of 42,538 records,
corresponding to 11,995 different individuals. We focus on employees who are older than
25 and younger than 55 years of age. We drop employees with on-call jobs and those
who, according to their employment contract, have less than 10 or more than 60 weekly
working hours. We keep only workers who are in the core study on work and schooling
for at least two consecutive years: this restriction is due to the fact that we will estimate
a model in first differences. After the application of these sample selection criteria, we
are left with an unbalanced panel of 3,117 workers for a total of 12,904 records over the
4See Knoef and de Vos (2009) for an evaluation of the representativeness of the LISS panel and Scher-
penzeel (2011, 2010) and Scherpenzeel and Das (2010) for methodological notes on the design of the LISS
panel.
5See http://www.lissdata.nl/dataarchive/study_units/view/1 for the full list of studies of the LISS panel.
6About 5.5% of the 2008 interviews were conducted in July, whilst between 1.6% and 9.1% of the
interviews between 2009 and 2014 were collected in May.
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TABLE 1: THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNBALANCED
PANEL
Individual records Total records
Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
Years of observation frequencies frequencies frequencies frequencies
2008–2014 611 .196 4,277 .331
2008–2013 158 .051 948 .074
2008–2010 314 .101 924 .073
2008–2012 178 .057 890 .069
2008–2009 441 .141 882 .068
2012–2014 273 .088 819 .064
2008–2011 179 .057 716 .056
2010–2014 126 .040 630 .049
2011–2014 60 .019 240 .019
2009–2014 39 .013 234 .018
2010–2011 115 .037 230 .018
2012–2013 114 .037 228 .018
2008–2009/2011–2014 38 .012 228 .018
2010–2013 51 .016 204 .016
2010–2012 56 .018 168 .013
2013–2014 78 .025 156 .012
2008–2010/2012–2014 24 .008 144 .011
2008–2011/2013–2014 23 .007 138 .011
2009–2010 56 .018 112 .009
2008–2010/2012–2013 21 .007 105 .008
Further 16 trajectories 162 .052 613 .047
Total N=3,117 1.000 NT=12,904 1.000
years from 2008 until 2014.7 Table 1 clarifies the structure of the resulting panel dataset.
Table 2 reports relative and absolute frequencies of workers who have received firm-
sponsored training in the last 12 months by gender and by contractual working hours.
Almost 53% of the employees in our sample are women. Women working part-time8 are
much more likely to receive firm-sponsored training than men (30.9% for women against
24.8% for men).
Figure 2 depicts by gender the share of workers receiving firm-sponsored training by
classes of contractual weekly working hours. Both male and female part-timers have a
lower probability of receiving firm-sponsored training but the relationship is much steeper
for men. Whereas for full-time working men and women the incidence of firm-sponsored
training is not very different, in the 10-20 working hours category the share of women
receiving firm-sponsored training is about 25% while for men it is only about 12%.
Figure 3 displays the histogram estimator of the density of the contractual working
7When we keep employees between 25 and 55 years of age, the sample shrinks to 16,071 observations
(5,377 individuals). By selecting those with weekly working hours between 10 and 60, we are left with
15,537 records (5,196 different workers). Finally, removing those who are not in the sample for at least two
consecutive years restricts the sample to 12,904 observations (3,117 workers).
8A worker is a part-timer if (s)he works strictly less than 30 hours per week.
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TABLE 2: FREQUENCIES OF WORKERS RECEIVING
FIRM-SPONSORED TRAINING BY PART-TIME AND GENDER




Full-time 0.629 (3,685) 0.371 (2,177) 1.000 (5,862)
Part-time 0.752 (200) 0.248 (66) 1.000 (266)
Total 0.634 (3,885) 0.366 (2,243) 1.000 (6,128)
Women
Full-time 0.584 (1,773) 0.416 (1,262) 1.000 (3,035)
Part-time 0.691 (2,585) 0.309 (1,156) 1.000 (3,741)
Total 0.643 (4,358) 0.357 (2,418) 1.000 (6,766)
hours by gender, showing that in the Netherlands men are concentrated between 36-40
hours of work per week, whilst women are more scattered with the mode of the female
distribution at 24 weekly working hours. Table 3 reports summary statistics of the vari-
ables used in the econometric analysis by gender. More than one third of the employ-
ees attended at least one training course sponsored by the employer in the preceding 12
months and almost 7.5% of men and 9.5% of women have a temporary job (either fixed-
term job or temporary work agency job).9 The average number of contractual working
hours is much larger for men: 37.6 hours against 27.3 hours of women. The average age
is about 42 years with 11 years of job tenure for men and 10 years for women. More than
47% have at least a higher secondary degree. On average each household has 3 members
and 1.2 children living in the household. More than 19% of the people are single and
about 40% live in a very or extremely urban area. Women are more likely than men to
work in a public or semi-public company and to work in the sector of education, health or
welfare.
4 Econometric Modeling
We are primarily interested in understanding whether there are gender differences in
the way in which working hours might affect employees’ probability of receiving firm-
sponsored training. We will therefore specify and estimate a linear equation for the prob-
ability of receiving firm-sponsored training as a function of contractual working time
and a set of controls capturing individual heterogeneity. The variable for the contrac-
tual working hours is potentially endogenous for several reasons. First, there might be
9We do not include in the sample on-call workers as they are deemed to have structurally different jobs,
given the production technology of the sectors where they are employed.
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FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGE OF WORKERS RECEIVING FIRM-SPONSORED TRAINING BY
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TABLE 3: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE POOLED SAMPLE
BY GENDER
Men Women
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Firm-sponsored training 0.366 0.482 0.357 0.479
Contractual working hours 37.563 4.491 27.338 8.308
Part-time job(a) 0.043 0.204 0.552 0.497
Age in years 42.06 8.14 41.28 8.46
Education
Primary 0.032 0.177 0.032 0.175
Intermediate secondary (vmbo/mbo) 0.489 0.500 0.483 0.500
Higher secondary (havo/hbo) 0.365 0.481 0.382 0.486
University or more 0.113 0.317 0.101 0.302
Head of the household 0.875 0.331 0.343 0.475
Single 0.198 0.398 0.222 0.416
Urban area 0.401 0.490 0.410 0.492
Temporary job 0.075 0.264 0.095 0.293
Job tenure in 1000 days 3.994 3,356 3.598 3.053
Public employment 0.279 0.448 0.470 0.499
Sector
Agriculture/Mining/Manufacturing 0.304 0.460 0.073 0.260
Retail trade/Transport/Communication 0.138 0.345 0.105 0.307
Finance 0.059 0.235 0.051 0.220
Services 0.195 0.396 0.146 0.353
Education/Health/Welfare 0.118 0.323 0.452 0.498
Other sectors 0.186 0.389 0.173 0.378
Occupation
High skilled white collar(b) 0.208 0.406 0.097 0.297
Low skilled white collar(c) 0.512 0.500 0.790 0.407
High skilled blue collar(d) 0.140 0.347 0.016 0.124
Low skilled blue collar(e) 0.139 0.346 0.097 0.296
Firm size (number of employees)
(0− 10] employees 0.144 0.351 0.203 0.402
(10− 20] employees 0.111 0.314 0.138 0.345
(20− 100] employees 0.309 0.462 0.278 0.448
More than 100 employees 0.337 0.473 0.236 0.425
Number of employees unknown 0.098 0.297 0.145 0.352
# of household components 3.006 1.376 2.973 1.289
# of kids in the household 1.180 1.164 1.180 1.101
Year
2008 0.161 0.367 0.156 0.363
2009 0.170 0.375 0.169 0.375
2010 0.155 0.362 0.157 0.364
2011 0.134 0.341 0.139 0.346
2012 0.144 0.352 0.145 0.352
2013 0.131 0.338 0.133 0.340
2014 0.104 0.305 0.100 0.300
# of observations (# of individuals) 6,128 (1,468) 6,776 (1,649)
(a) The full-time indicator is based on contractual weekly working hours. We define as full-
timers those employees with 30 or more contractual working hours per week.
(b) High skilled white collar workers have a higher academic profession (e.g. architect,
physician, scholar, engineer) or a higher supervisory profession (e.g. manager, director,
supervisory civil servant).
(c) Low skilled white collar workers have an intermediate academic profession (e.g. teacher,
nurse, social worker, policy assistant) or an intermediate supervisory or commercial pro-
fession (e.g. head representative, department manager, shopkeeper) or other mental work.
(d) High skilled blue collar workers have a skilled and supervisory manual work (e.g. elec-
trician).
(e) Low skilled blue collar workers have a semi-skilled (e.g. driver) or an unskilled manual
work (e.g. cleaner).
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self-selection issues determined by unobserved heterogeneity. Workers having contracts
for longer weekly working hours might have different motivations, skills and attachment
to the labor market than employees working a smaller number of hours. Second, there
might be feedback effects, i.e. shocks in the training indicator affecting the future level
of working time. For instance, workers with a positive transitory shock in the probabil-
ity of receiving training might have the opportunity to accumulate human capital, get a
promotion, higher wages and, thereby, different working time choices. Alternatively, if
there is a negative shock in the probability of receiving firm-sponsored training, employ-
ees might lose the possibility to get a promotion and new responsibilities that might be
linked to longer working hours. Lastly, the choice of the working hours might send to
the employer different signals depending on employee’s gender, as well as all the other
covariates might affect the probability of receiving firm-sponsored training differently for
men and women. Hence, the econometric analysis will be conducted separately for men
and women.
Denote by yit the dummy indicator equal to 1 if employee i received firm-sponsored
training in the 12 months before time t and 0 otherwise. The conditional probability that
yit is equal to 1 is specified, for t = 1, . . . , T and i = 1, . . . , N , as
P (yit = 1|hit,xit, ci) = E (yit|hit,xit, ci) = δhit + x′itβ + ci, (1)
where hit is the contractual working hours, xit is a 1 × K vector of observed individual
characteristics and ci is time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The model in Equation
(1), if expressed in the error equation form, is
yit = δhit + x
′
itβ + ci + uit, (2)
where uit is an idiosyncratic error term. The coefficient of primary interest is δ, which
is the marginal effect of increasing weekly working hours on the probability of receiving
firm-sponsored training. If ci were not correlated to hi, where hi ≡ [hi1, hi2, . . . , hiT ], and
hi were strictly exogenous, i.e. E (uit|hi,xi) = 0 for all t = 1, . . . , T , then the Ordinary
Least Square (OLS) estimator of Equation (2), ignoring the presence of ci, would return
unbiased and consistent estimates of δ. However, the unobserved heterogeneity term ci
might be correlated to the observables. For example, more career oriented employees
might be more willing to receive firm-sponsored training and be more likely to work
more hours per week. If Cov (hi, ci) 6= 0, we cannot consistently estimate Equation (2)
by OLS simply ignoring ci.
By taking the first difference of both sides of Equation (2), we get rid of the fixed
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effects ci yielding
∆yit = δ∆hit + ∆x
′
itβ + ∆uit. (3)
Under the strict exogeneity assumption, the OLS estimator yields unbiased estimates of
the coefficients in Equation (3). However, as mentioned above, there might be good rea-
sons to believe in the presence of feedback effects from yit to hir, with r > t, i.e. in shocks
in the training indicator affecting future levels of working time. If so, the strict exogeneity
assumption would fail. We relax the strict exogeneity assumption and replace it by the
sequential moment restriction (Chamberlain, 1992): E (uit|hit, hit−1, . . . , hi1,xi, ci) = 0
for all t = 1, . . . , T . Hence, we allow arbitrary correlation between uit and future val-
ues of the working hours indicator (ht+1, . . . , ht+T ). In other words, as pointed out by
Wooldridge (2010), we assume that once we condition on (hit,xi, ci), no past values of
hit affects the probability of receiving firm-sponsored training at time t, meaning that,
conditional on the current level of working hours (and the other observables and unob-
servables), we assume that the employers do not exploit information about past levels of
contractual working hours (or their variations) when planning how to allocate training re-
sources among the employees. Henceforth, under the sequential moment restriction, the
longitudinal dimension of our dataset provides a valid instrument to take into account the
potential endogeneity of ∆hit in Equation (3) because of feedback effects. The sequential
moment restriction indeed implies that hit−1 is not correlated to ∆uit. Moreover, hit−1
is very likely be a strong predictor of the endogenous variable ∆hit. We will therefore
use the Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimator with hit−1 as an instrument for ∆hit to
consistently estimate Equation (3) in the presence of feedback effects from participation
in firm-sponsored training to weekly working hours.
A further problem which might arise and invalidate the sequential moment restriction
and the validity of hit−1 as a valid instrument for ∆hit is reverse causality. At each wave,
we have information about training incidence in the 12 months before the interview and
the contractual working hours at the time of the interview. We do not know thereby
when the contractual working time was set and whether the contractual working time is
predetermined with respect to training incidence. If hit is not predetermined with respect
to yit, then it might be that training participation in the 12 months before time t could
affect the contractual working time declared at time t. Thereby, in order to avoid biases
due to reverse causality, we also estimate Equation (3) under a less strict version of the
sequential moment restriction: E (uit|hit−1, . . . , hi1,xi, ci) = 0. We use thereby hit−2,
instead of hit−1, as an instrument for ∆hit. By doing so, we allow working hours to be
contemporaneously correlated to the error term.
We will use two different measures of contractual working hours hit: the first one
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TABLE 4: WITHIN INDIVIDUAL TIME VARIATION IN THE WEEKLY
CONTRACTUAL WORKING HOURS AND PART-TIME INDICATOR
Men Women
Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
frequencies frequencies frequencies frequencies
Variation in working hours ∆hit = hit − hit−1
Less than −20 4 0.001 5 0.001
[−20, 10) 10 0.002 57 0.011
[−10, 0) 128 0.028 336 0.067
0 4,246 0.930 4,216 0.838
(0, 10] 157 0.034 380 0.075
(10, 20] 16 0.004 37 0.007
More than 20 4 0.001 3 0.001
Variation in part-time indicator ∆ptit = ptit − ptit−1
−1 27 0.006 101 0.020
0 4,513 0.989 4,816 0.957
1 25 0.005 117 0.023
Total 4,565 5,034
counts the number of contractual weekly working hours; the second one is a dichotomous
indicator equal to one if the worker is a part-timer (strictly less than 30 weekly working
hours) and zero otherwise.
When the equation for the probability of receiving firm-sponsored training is taken in
first differences, identification of the effect of working hours is based on its time variation
at individual level. Table 4 reports the distribution of the within individual time varia-
tion of the working time variables by gender, since we will estimate the baseline model
separately for men and women. If we consider the part-time indicator as a measure of
working hours, then we have little variation over time at individual level to identify the
effect: only 1.1% of men and 4.3% of women experience a change in the part-time indi-
cator. The contractual weekly working hours show instead more variation over time, with
7% of the male observations and 16.2% of female observations varying the contractual
weekly working hours from one year to the next one.
5 Empirical findings
5.1 Baseline models
Table 5 reports the estimation results in level and first differences of the linear probability
model in Equation (1), separately for men (top panel) and women (bottom panel), with
contractual weekly working hours as the measure of working hours. Table 6 reports the
estimation results of the same model, but using the part-time indicator as variable of
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primary interest.
The OLS estimator of Equation (2) ignoring ci returns quite similar results for men
and women. An increase by one hour in the contractual weekly working hours is asso-
ciated to a significant increase by 0.6 percentage points in the probability of receiving
firm-sponsored training, both for men and women. Moving from full-time to part-time
employment significantly reduces the probability of firm-sponsored training by 9.4 per-
centage points for men and 7.4 percentage points for women. The positive correlation
between working time and the probability of receiving firm-sponsored training is theo-
retically expected. If the labor market is not perfect and is affected by a certain degree
of monopsony power, employers can momentarily extract rents from the trained employ-
ees (Acemoglu, 1997), the employer might be more willing to provide full-timers with
training, since training costs will be recouped in a briefer period and, thereby, with a
smaller probability of a loss in case of the worker quitting the position. However, there
might be other reasons explaining the positive association between working time and firm-
sponsored training. First, the contractual weekly working hours might be a signal used by
the employers to approximate workers’ job and labor market attachment: the higher the
propensity of a worker to work for a larger number of hours, the higher the attachment to
the labor force and/or to her job. This implies a lower probability of quitting and, thereby,
higher chances for the firm to recoup the training investment from a worker who is willing
to accept a contract with a larger number of working hours. Second, the positive corre-
lation could be explained by omitted variables that jointly determine both working hours
and the propensity of receiving firm-sponsored training: for example, more able workers
might be more likely to receive firm-sponsored training because (s)he is expected to learn
a lot from a training course and, at the same time, might be more (or less) likely to work
more hours since higher abilities might be reflected in higher wage rates. A priori it is
difficult to predict the direction of the omitted variables bias, since it depends on the sign
of the correlation between the unobservables, working hours and training chances.
The OLS estimator of Equation (3), after first-differencing the dataset, returns an esti-
mated coefficient of working hours variable which is cleaned by the confounding factors
due to workers’ unobserved heterogeneity. Interestingly, a gender difference in the impact
of working hours on the probability of receiving firm-sponsored training arises: whilst for
men working one more hour in a week significantly increases by 1.1 percentage points
the training chances, for women the effect is nil (+0.1 percentage points) and not sig-
nificantly different from zero; while for men working part-time reduces the probability
of firm-sponsored training by 12.8 percentage points, for women the effect of working
part-time is positive and not significant (+3.4 percentage points).
When we estimate the model in first-difference by way of 2SLS, using the lag of
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TABLE 5: ESTIMATION RESULTS OF THE MODEL FOR FIRM-SPONSORED TRAINING IN
LEVELS AND FIRST DIFFERENCES BY GENDER (CONTRACTUAL WEEKLY WORKING
HOURS)
Levels First-difference First-difference First-difference
OLS OLS 2SLS, instrument hit−1 2SLS, instrument hit−2
Variables Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
a) Men
Contractual weekly working hours 0.00550 *** 0.00187 0.01075 *** 0.00342 0.02803 *** 0.00989 0.04666 * 0.02795
(Age-25)/10 -0.02693 0.04251 – – – – – –
(Age-25)2/100 -0.00296 0.01326 0.00312 0.03600 0.01975 0.03707 0.11431 ** 0.05372
Education - Reference: Primary
Interm. Secondary 0.00427 0.04625 – – – – – –
Higher secondary 0.02828 0.04918 – – – – – –
University or more 0.02191 0.05630 – – – – – –
Head of the household 0.03605 0.02412 -0.05108 0.05730 -0.04523 0.05687 -0.04176 0.07823
Single -0.03622 * 0.02105 -0.07530 0.05123 -0.08032 0.05100 -0.07034 0.06181
Urban area -0.03536 ** 0.01753 0.04724 0.08530 0.04811 0.08560 -0.03114 0.12943
Temporary contract -0.07283 ** 0.02902 -0.01822 0.04683 -0.01173 0.04704 0.07057 0.06155
Job tenure in days/100 -0.00025 0.00081 0.00451 *** 0.00172 0.00493 *** 0.00172 0.00587 *** 0.00223
(Job tenure in days/100)2 -0.00000 0.00001 -0.00006 *** 0.00002 -0.00006 *** 0.00002 -0.00007 *** 0.00003
Public employment 0.06082 ** 0.02544 0.07440 0.07544 0.09240 0.07594 -0.12171 0.10750
Occupation indicators – Reference: High-skilled white collar worker
Low skilled white collar -0.03690 0.02483 -0.09673 0.07230 -0.08861 0.07223 -0.10680 0.13272
High skilled blue collar 0.02721 0.03498 -0.01217 0.13460 -0.01640 0.13287 -0.15569 0.26303
Low skilled blue collar -0.05236 0.03542 -0.00073 0.11254 -0.01253 0.11126 -0.05497 0.23270
Constant 0.17481 * 0.09733 -0.03289 0.02148 -0.03919 * 0.02174 -0.06840 ** 0.02842
# of observationsNT (N ) 6,128 (1,468) 4,565 (1,468) 4,565 (1,468) 3,002 (1,081)
R2 0.064 0.011 – –
F-test of excluded instruments – – 46.47 11.07
Hausman test of endogeneity – – F(1,1467)=3.89 F(1,1080)=2.73
– – p-value=0.047 p-value=0.099
Hansen J statistics if hit−1 and – – – χ
2(1)=2.654
hit−2 are jointly used as instruments – – – p-value=0.103
Sample selection test: p-value 0.502 0.479 0.487 0.397
b) Women
Contractual weekly working hours 0.00579 *** 0.00099 0.00148 0.00279 0.01146 0.00890 0.01485 0.01513
(Age-25)/10 -0.08946 ** 0.03637 – – – – – –
(Age-25)2/100 0.01575 0.01100 0.02707 0.03229 0.01649 0.03314 0.06513 0.04575
Education - Reference: Primary
Interm. Secondary -0.04265 0.04008 – – – – – –
Higher secondary 0.01602 0.04127 – – – – – –
University or more 0.05682 0.04865 – – – – – –
Head of the household -0.00094 0.02355 0.03443 0.05149 0.03043 0.05115 0.03652 0.05604
Single -0.03156 0.02516 -0.09979 * 0.05853 -0.10376 * 0.05868 -0.12098 0.07491
Urban area -0.04285 *** 0.01533 0.09056 0.07522 0.08531 0.07500 0.10553 0.10180
Temporary contract -0.05918 ** 0.02484 -0.00878 0.03579 -0.00626 0.03605 0.00372 0.05323
Job tenure in days/100 0.00071 0.00084 0.00032 0.00157 0.00034 0.00159 -0.00040 0.00198
(Job tenure in days/100)2 -0.00000 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00002 -0.00001 0.00002 -0.00001 0.00003
Public employment 0.04651 ** 0.01954 0.05992 0.06163 0.06703 0.06319 -0.02547 0.09486
Occupation indicators – Reference: High-skilled white collar worker
Low skilled white collar -0.04817 0.03098 0.21565 *** 0.07638 0.23903 *** 0.07788 0.24801 ** 0.11791
High skilled blue collar -0.05449 0.06894 -0.05989 0.18270 -0.03822 0.17925 -0.16588 0.24225
Low skilled blue collar -0.16198 *** 0.03686 0.15462 0.09815 0.17919 * 0.09805 0.03870 0.17432
Constant 0.31103 *** 0.07486 -0.04002 ** 0.01921 -0.03658 * 0.01912 -0.09378 *** 0.02691
# of observationsNT (N ) 6,776 (1,649) 5,034 (1,649) 5,034 (1,649) 3,292 (1,159)
R2 0.098 0.007 – –
F-test of excluded instruments – – 142.66 65.28
Hausman test of endogeneity – – F(1, 1648)=1.38 F(1,1158)=1.06
– – p-value=0.240 p-value=0.304
Hansen J statistics if hit−1 and – – – χ
2(1)=2.381
hit−2 are jointly used as instruments – – – p-value=0.123
Sample selection test: p-value 0.161 0.322 0.320 0.850
Notes: * Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Year, sectoral and
firm size dummies are included in the model specification but their estimated coefficients are not reported. “2SLS, instrument hit−1” refers to the model in which we use the 2SLS
estimator with hit−1 as a valid instrument for ∆hit to allow feedback effects from participation in firm-sponsored training to working hours. “2SLS, instrument hit−2” refers to
the model in which we use the 2SLS estimator with hit−2 as a valid instrument for ∆hit to further avoid reverse causality.
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TABLE 6: ESTIMATION RESULTS OF THE MODEL FOR FIRM-SPONSORED TRAINING IN
LEVELS AND FIRST DIFFERENCES BY GENDER (PART-TIME INDICATOR)
Levels First-difference First-difference First-difference
OLS OLS 2SLS, instrument hit−1 2SLS, instrument hit−2
Variables Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
a) Men
Working part-time -0.09410 ** 0.03789 -0.12804 ** 0.06312 -0.52062 *** 0.17022 -0.70021 0.54980
(Age-25)/10 -0.02525 0.04256 – – – – – –
(Age-25)2/100 -0.00356 0.01328 -0.00222 0.03606 0.01312 0.03648 0.10221 * 0.05363
Education - Reference: Primary
Interm. Secondary 0.00506 0.04642 – – – – – –
Higher secondary 0.02808 0.04935 – – – – – –
University or more 0.02237 0.05651 – – – – – –
Head of the household 0.03898 0.02395 -0.05110 0.05742 -0.03999 0.05743 -0.03722 0.07912
Single -0.03659 * 0.02114 -0.07548 0.05130 -0.08561 * 0.05148 -0.07440 0.06327
Urban area -0.03573 ** 0.01748 0.04583 0.08502 0.04318 0.08455 -0.03993 0.12859
Temporary contract -0.07460 ** 0.02905 -0.02169 0.04713 -0.01994 0.04834 0.06303 0.06655
Job tenure in days/100 -0.00026 0.00081 0.00441 ** 0.00173 0.00492 *** 0.00172 0.00567 ** 0.00225
(Job tenure in days/100)2 -0.00000 0.00001 -0.00005 *** 0.00002 -0.00006 *** 0.00002 -0.00007 *** 0.00003
Public employment 0.05492 ** 0.02534 0.06531 0.07593 0.07180 0.07554 -0.16250 0.10869
Occupation indicators – Reference: High-skilled white collar worker
Low skilled white collar -0.03887 0.02487 -0.09738 0.07328 -0.08385 0.07444 -0.10367 0.14265
High skilled blue collar 0.02386 0.03507 -0.01024 0.13547 -0.01238 0.13442 -0.17870 0.27122
Low skilled blue collar -0.05500 0.03549 0.00320 0.11308 -0.00726 0.11231 -0.05480 0.25187
Constant 0.38823 *** 0.06877 -0.03045 0.02147 -0.03499 0.02165 -0.06032 ** 0.02785
# of observationsNT (N ) 6,128 (1,468) 4,565 (1,468) 4,565 (1,468) 3,002 (1,081)
R2 0.063 0.010 – –
F-test of excluded instruments – – 29.36 7.70
Hausman test of endogeneity – – F(1,1467)=7.57 F(1,1080)=2.52
– – p-value=0.006 p-value=0.113
Hansen J statistics if hit−1 and – – – χ
2(1)=1.214
hit−2 are jointly used as instruments – – – p-value=0.271
Sample selection test: p-value 0.481 0.456 0.403 0.456
b) Women
Working part-time -0.07404 *** 0.01636 0.03376 0.03976 -0.04493 0.12498 -0.24565 0.23275
(Age-25)/10 -0.10274 *** 0.03614 – – – – – –
(Age-25)2/100 0.01906 * 0.01097 0.03104 0.03246 0.02544 0.03317 0.06286 0.04722
Education - Reference: Primary
Interm. Secondary -0.04673 0.04022 – – – – – –
Higher secondary 0.01736 0.04146 – – – – – –
University or more 0.06103 0.04862 – – – – – –
Head of the household 0.00584 0.02325 0.03655 0.05162 0.03300 0.05149 0.02768 0.05754
Single -0.02996 0.02505 -0.09908 * 0.05846 -0.09938 * 0.05841 -0.11022 0.07531
Urban area -0.04153 *** 0.01537 0.09201 0.07537 0.09045 0.07484 0.10422 0.10098
Temporary contract -0.06014 ** 0.02500 -0.00908 0.03570 -0.00926 0.03571 0.00333 0.05310
Job tenure in days/100 0.00076 0.00084 0.00030 0.00157 0.00034 0.00157 -0.00048 0.00200
(Job tenure in days/100)2 -0.00000 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00002 -0.00001 0.00002 -0.00001 0.00003
Public employment 0.04342 ** 0.01957 0.05790 0.06120 0.06016 0.06178 -0.02716 0.09583
Occupation indicators – Reference: High-skilled white collar worker
Low skilled white collar -0.05418 * 0.03072 0.20800 *** 0.07630 0.21776 *** 0.07761 0.23877 ** 0.11671
High skilled blue collar -0.05976 0.06789 -0.06825 0.18324 -0.05624 0.18282 -0.16060 0.24128
Low skilled blue collar -0.17975 *** 0.03615 0.14556 0.09837 0.15819 0.09935 0.03844 0.17727
Constant 0.52973 *** 0.06403 -0.04165 ** 0.01933 -0.03905 ** 0.01949 -0.09397 *** 0.02703
# of observationsNT (N ) 6,776 (1,649) 5,034 (1,649) 5,034 (1,649) 3,292 (1,159)
R2 0.096 0.008 – –
F-test of excluded instruments – – 183.93 83.44
Hausman test of endogeneity – – F(1, 1648)=0.46 F(1,1158)=1.77
– – p-value=0.500 p-value=0.184
Hansen J statistics if hit−1 and – – – χ
2(1)=3.765
hit−2 are jointly used as instruments – – – p-value=0.052
Sample selection test: p-value 0.238 0.324 0.324 0.403
Notes: * Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Year, sectoral and
firm size dummies are included in the model specification but their estimated coefficients are not reported. “2SLS, instrument hit−1” refers to the model in which we use the 2SLS
estimator with hit−1 as a valid instrument for ∆hit to allow feedback effects from participation in firm-sponsored training to working hours. “2SLS, instrument hit−2” refers to
the model in which we use the 2SLS estimator with hit−2 as a valid instrument for ∆hit to further avoid reverse causality.
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order one of working hours (hit−1) to instrument the first difference of working hours
(∆hit),10 we make the estimation robust to the failure of the strict exogeneity assumption.
In other words, we allow shocks in the dependent variable to affect future realizations of
the working hours variable. Form the qualitative point of view, the estimation results are in
line with those from the first-difference OLS estimator: working hours have a significant
and positive effect for men, but no effect for women. From a quantitative point of view,
the effect for men is much larger: one more hour of work in a week implies a higher
probability of receiving firm-sponsored training by about 2.8 percentage points; moving
from full-time to part-time generates a reduction in the training probability by about 52
percentage points. These estimation results are confirmed by the 2SLS estimator using
the lag of order two of working hours (hit−2) to instrument the first difference of working
hours (∆hit). The F -test for excluded instrument is much lower and, for men, close to the
weak instrument rule of thumb value of 10 identified by Staiger and Stock (1997). The
estimation results from the 2SLS with hit−2 as excluded instrument should therefore be
read with cautions, given that they might be suffer from a bias due to weak instruments. It
is worth noting that: the Hansen J statistics reported at the bottom of each panel of Tables
5 and 6 seems to support the conditional orthogonality assumption of the instruments;11
the sample selection tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of no sample selection bias
due to the non observability of training for individuals who do not participate to the labor
market as employee.12
Table 7 summarizes the estimated coefficients of working hours displayed in Tables 5
and 6 and the gender difference in the effect. We report in bold our preferred estimates.
10The instrument has explanatory power both for men and women, as testified by the F -test for excluded
instruments reported in Tables 5 and 6 (Staiger and Stock, 1997).
11As pointed out by Parente and Silva (2012), the overidentification test gives little information when the
instruments measure the same process and, thereby, should be taken with caution.
12We use the number of the components of the household and the number of children living in the
household as exclusion restrictions in the employment selection equation. This means that we assume that
conditional on working hours, the other observables and, in the equations in first-differences, the individual
fixed effect, the number of children and household components do not affect firm-sponsored training. This
assumption is supported by the institutional set-up. In the last twenty years, the Dutch government has
indeed implemented some policies aimed at removing barriers to part-time work, culminating in 2000 with
the possibility for workers to flexibility adjust upward or downward the number of working hours within
their current job, unless the request is in conflict with employers’ business interest. Hence, family care, for
instance due to the presence of kids, will be reflected and incorporated in the value of working hours. The
results in Georgellis and Thomas (2007), who found that in Germany the number of children has a negative
impact on employer-provided training for both men and women, seem to move against our assumption.
However, Georgellis and Thomas (2007) do not control for working hours. In our model, when we include
the number of kids among the set of regressors, its estimated coefficient is not significantly different from
zero, for both men and women, and all the other results are left unchanged. These estimation results are not
presented in the text but are available from the authors upon request.
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TABLE 7: GENDER DIFFERENCES IN THE EFFECT OF WORKING HOURS ON
FIRM-SPONSORED TRAINING (PREFERRED MODELS IN BOLD)
Men Women Gender difference in the effect§
Coeff. Coeff. Differ. S.E.‡
Independent variable: Contractual weekly working hours
Levels OLS 0.00550 0.00579 -0.00029 0.00204
First-difference OLS 0.01075 0.00148 0.00927 ** 0.00463
First-difference 2SLS, instrument hit−1 0.02803 0.01146 0.01657 0.01400
First-difference 2SLS, instrument hit−2 0.04666 0.01485 0.03181 1.51367
Gender difference in the effect from the preferred models (in bold)† 0.02655 ** 0.01080
Independent variable: Part-time indicator
Levels OLS -0.09410 -0.07404 -0.02006 0.04095
First-difference OLS -0.12804 0.03376 -0.16180 ** 0.07940
First-difference 2SLS, instrument hit−1 -0.52062 -0.04493 -0.47569 ** 0.21890
First-difference 2SLS, instrument hit−2 -0.70021 -0.24565 -0.45456 1.64889
Gender difference in the effect from the preferred models (in bold)† -0.55439 *** 0.18457
Notes: * Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. The standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
§ The gender difference of the effect is computed as the difference between the male effect and the female effect.
† The estimated coefficients of the preferred models are in bold. For men, the preferred estimator is first-difference 2SLS, with
hit−1 as instrument, because the Hausman test reveals an endogeneity problem of the working hours variable in first-difference
OLS and the Hansen J statistic does not reveal any problem in the use of hit−1 as excluded instrument for ∆hit. Since for
women there is no evidence for the endogeneity of ∆hit, the preferred estimator is first-difference OLS.
‡ Bootstrapped standard errors clustering at individual level with 1,000 replications.
For men, the preferred estimator is first-difference 2SLS with hit−1 as instrument, be-
cause: i) the Hausman test reveals an endogeneity problem of the working hours variable
in first-difference OLS; ii) the Hansen J statistic provides evidence that hit−1 and hit−2
identify the same vector of parameters. Since for women there is no evidence for the en-
dogeneity of ∆hit, the preferred estimator is first-difference OLS. Table 7 reports the gen-
der difference in the effect of working hours on the propensity to receive firm-sponsored
training both estimator by estimator and, in the last row of each panel, by comparing the
male preferred estimate with the female one. We find that the gender difference in the
effect is large and significantly different from zero. We conclude thereby that working
hours affect firm-sponsored training for men but not for women: whilst working hours
positively affect the training chances for men, it has no impact on female firm-sponsored
training.
The impact of other regressors on firm-sponsored training
If we limit the comments on the impact of other regressors to the preferred models for men
and women, it is clear that few other covariates have a significant impact on the probability
of receiving firm-sponsored training. For men, job tenure plays an important role: it is
an inverted U-shaped relationship with maximum at about 11 years and 4 months of job
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seniority. At this level of job seniority, the probability of firm-sponsored training is 10.2
percentage points higher than the one of newly hired workers (who are the reference).
Then, it declines with job tenure until newly hired workers have the same probability of
firm-sponsored training as workers with about 22 years and 8 months of job tenure.
For women, job tenure is instead not correlated to firm-sponsored training. Being
single has a negative effect, although significant only at the 10% level, maybe because it
might be a proxy of a higher propensity to move from job to job. Finally, low skilled-white
collar women are the most likely to be trained by their employers.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
One could wonder that the estimated effect of working hours on the probability of receiv-
ing firm-sponsored training could be biased by the presence of unobservables at firm level.
First-differencing indeed removes the time-constant unobservables at worker level, but it
is not able to eliminate the time-constant unobservables at firm level if workers changed
firms from the survey at time t − 1 to the one at time t. The unobservables at firm level,
like production technology, firm management and human resources practices, might be
determinants of both the working hours and firm-sponsored training. Moreover, if the
correlation between firm unobservables and the dependent and independent variables is
related to gender, the presence of such firm heterogeneity might asymmetrically bias the
estimated coefficients of men and women.
We check the robustness of our results to unobservables at firm level following two
approaches. In the first one, we restrict the sample only to firm stayers, i.e. to those
workers who do not change firm from one survey to the next one.13 For firm-stayers,
first-differencing removes unobservables both at individual and firm level. This approach
is in the spirit of Altonji and Shakotko (1978) and Topel (1991). However, by doing
so, we possibly open the door to a sample selection problem (Topel, 1991), since stay-
ers might not be a random sample from the underlying population of workers and the
selection rule could depend on gender. Table 8 displays the estimation results from the
first-difference OLS and 2SLS (with ∆hit instrumented by hit−1) estimators by gender.
When the variable of primary interest is the part-time indicator, the estimated effects of
the working time on firm-sponsored training are in line with those of the baseline model
from the qualitative viewpoint: i) a large and significant reduction in the probability of
firm-sponsored training for male working part-time with the same magnitude as in the
benchmark estimates (−0.474 against −0.521); ii) the effect is not significantly different
13A firm identifier is not available in the LISS panel data. We use the information on the firm seniority
declared by the individual and on the survey times to identify the “stayers”.
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from zero for women as in the benchmark estimates.14 When the variable of primary in-
terest is contractual weekly working hours, the positive relation between working hours
and firm-sponsored training shrinks to zero for men, with the gender gap becoming much
narrower in magnitude. This might suggest that firm heterogeneity is important, or, as
an alternative, that firm-stayers are not a random draw from the underlying population of
workers (Topel, 1991) and the selection rule is gender specific.
TABLE 8: THE EFFECT OF WORKING HOURS ON THE PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING
FIRM-SPONSORED TRAINING FOR FIRM STAYERS
Men Women
———————————————— ————————————————
Coeff. Std. Err. Observations Coeff. Std. Err. Observations
Independent variable: Contractual weekly working hours
First difference OLS 0.00302 0.00363 3,924 0.00578 * 0.00342 4,294
First-difference 2SLS, instrument hit−1 0.02158 0.01437 3,924 0.02024 0.01399 4,294
Tests after 2SLS
F-test of excluded instruments 30.73 98.01
Hausman test of endogeneity F(1, 1367)=2.00, p-value=0.158 F(1, 1538)=1.14, p-value=0.285
Independent variable: Part-time indicator
First difference OLS -0.03098 0.07494 3,924 -0.01989 0.04693 4,294
First-difference 2SLS, instrument hit−1 -0.47352 ** 0.22373 3,924 -0.13153 0.18438 4,294
Tests after 2SLS
F-test of excluded instruments 19.21 122.94
Hausman test of endogeneity F(1, 1367)=5.10, p-value=0.024 F(1, 1538)=0.40, p-value=0.526
Notes: * Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. The standard errors are robust to heteroskedas-
ticity and serial correlation. Firm movers are deleted from the sample, explaining the reduced sample size with respect to the sample
of the baseline models. We drop from the list of explanatory variables job and firm characteristics, since either they do not vary over
time for firm stayers or their time variation is too little. We report in bold the estimation results of the preferred models according to the
diagnostic test after 2SLS estimation.
In order to shed more light on the importance of firm unobservables we implement a
second check consisting in using a control function approach and, thereby, in plugging
into the main equation a further set of covariates to capture eventual heterogeneity re-
lated to firm and job characteristics. First, we included a set of twelve dummy variables
describing the job performed by the employee along several dimensions multiplied by
job seniority in days: if the employee can work at his/her own pace, if the work implies
getting dirty, if the work is dangerous, if the employee is in contact with hazardous sub-
stances, if the work is physically demanding, if the work implies lifting heavy objects, if
it requires kneeling or stooping, if it is tiring, if it implies mental effort, if concentration
is needed, if the work requires getting too busy and if it demands to relate well to other
people. Second, we interact among each other all the indicators of firm heterogeneity
14Differently from the benchmark estimates, for female firm-stayers working part-time decreases the
chances of firm-sponsored training. However, the effect is not precisely estimated.
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at the finest level observed in the original dataset: sector, firm size and the indicator for
the firm being public or private. We identify thereby 161 non-empty cells. We multiply
the corresponding dummy variables by job seniority in days and we plug the resulting
variables into the main equation among the other covariates. The idea of using these
higher-order interactions between observables characteristics at individual, job and firm
levels is in the same spirit of the approximation of the correlation between the firm fixed
effects and individual characteristics in Abowd et al. (1999). Table 9 displays the estima-
tion results when we augment the set of regressors by these higher order interactions of
firm characteristics and job type indicators. The estimated coefficients are very close to
those reported in Table 7.
TABLE 9: THE EFFECT OF WORKING HOURS ON THE PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING
FIRM-SPONSORED TRAINING AFTER INCLUDING INTERACTIONS OF FIRM
CHARACTERISTICS AND FURTHER JOB CHARACTERISTICS
Men Women
———————————————— ————————————————
Coeff. S.E. Observations Coeff. S.E. Observations
Independent variable: Contractual weekly working hours
Levels OLS 0.00530 *** 0.00181 6,128 0.00529 *** 0.00102 6,776
First-difference OLS 0.01078 *** 0.00345 4,565 0.00191 0.00285 5,034
First-difference 2SLS, instrument hit−1 0.02859 *** 0.01031 4,565 0.01054 0.00925 5,034
First-difference 2SLS, instrument hit−2 0.04642 0.02943 3,002 0.01144 0.01641 3,292
Independent variable: Part-time indicator
Levels OLS -0.10002 *** 0.03729 6,128 -0.06588 *** 0.01645 6,776
First-difference OLS -0.12187 * 0.06357 4,565 0.03063 0.04059 5,034
First-difference 2SLS, instrument hit−1 -0.49653 *** 0.17802 4,565 -0.04122 0.12985 5,034
First-difference 2SLS, instrument hit−2 -0.63879 0.57434 3,002 -0.17692 0.24657 3,292
Notes: * Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation. We report in bold the estimation results of the preferred models according to the diagnostic test after 2SLS estimation.
A third sensitivity analysis involves the specification of the main equation and the pos-
sible presence of biases in its estimation due to possible correlation between unobserv-
ables and changes in working hours. As a matter of fact, those individuals who decide to
modify their contractual working hours could be a selected sample of the population: indi-
viduals that are more ambitious, attached to the labor market and career oriented could be
less likely to experience a reduction in working time and more likely to get firm-sponsored
training. The variation in working hours could thereby be time-varying heterogeneity if
not included among the regressors. We thereby modify Equation (1) by including ∆hit
among the regressors:
P (yit = 1|hit,xit, ci) = δhit + α∆hit + x′itβ + ci. (4)
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We estimate this equation using the same strategy as in the benchmark model: OLS in
levels ignoring ci; OLS after first differencing so as to remove ci; 2SLS after first differ-
encing using hit−1 as an instrument for ∆hit and ∆hit−1 as an instrument for ∆∆hit−1.
The inclusion of ∆hit among the regressors makes us lose one time period and the source
of identification, the within-individual time variation, shrinks further. We thereby run this
sensitivity check only using the contractual weekly working hours as measure of working
time. Table 10 displays the estimation results of the coefficients of hit and ∆hit. They
are very much in line with those of the benchmark model and the estimated coefficients
of ∆hit are never significantly different from zero.
TABLE 10: ESTIMATION OF THE FIRM-SPONSORED TRAINING EQUATION




Coeff. Std. Err. Obs. Coeff. Std. Err. Obs.
Levels OLS hit 0.00477 ** 0.00220 4,565 0.00519 *** 0.00113 5,034
∆hit 0.00013 0.00338 -0.00256 0.00222
First difference OLS hit 0.01242 * 0.00651 3,002 0.00390 0.00410 3,292
∆hit -0.00535 0.00454 -0.00443 0.00306
First-difference 2SLS, hit 0.03781 * 0.02143 3,002 0.01269 0.01425 3,292instruments hit−1 and ∆hit−1 ∆hit -0.00927 0.00547 -0.00524 0.00338
Tests after 2SLS
F-test of excluded instruments ∆hit 18.50 45.93
∆∆hit 373.42 873.80
Hausman test of endogeneity F(2, 1080)=3.18, p-value=0.042 F(2, 1158)=1.92, p-value=0.147
Notes: * Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. The standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The reduction in the number of observations is due to the fact that, when we include
∆hit among the regressors, we lose one time period.
We run a fourth sensitivity check to test whether measurement error might be an is-
sue in the first difference estimation. As a matter of fact, errors of measurement in the
explanatory variables get magnified by the reduced variation implied by the elimination
of the unobserved heterogeneity (Griliches and Hausman, 1986). One may wonder that
gender differences in the effect of working hours on firm-sponsored training is not due to
economic reasons, but to a gender difference in the attenuation bias generated by gender
specific measurement errors. For example, on the one hand, if women change working
time more often, then they might be more likely than men to mis-report the actual working
time; on the other hand, if very few men modify their working time and maybe they do
it under very special circumstances, then they could be more likely to exactly report the
new working time regime. We assume that the measurement error is uncorrelated to the
explanatory variables and we correct for the potential bias induced by the measurement er-
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TABLE 11: TESTS FOR MEASUREMENT ERROR USING THE DESIRED WORKING HOURS AS
INSTRUMENT FOR CONTRACTUAL WORKING TIME
Men Women
—————————————————————- —————————————————————-
Hausman F -test excluded Hausman F -test excluded
statistic† p-value instruments Observ.§ statistic† p-value instruments Observ.§
Independent variable: contractual weekly working hours
First difference OLS 1.778 0.183 1.46 4,063 0.003 0.955 45.60 4,490
First-difference 2SLS, 1.334 0.248 16.08 4,063 0.505 0.477 68.64 4,490
instrument hit−1
Independent variable: part-time indicator
First difference OLS 1.778 0.183 5.76 4,063 0.047 0.829 38.05 4,490
First-difference 2SLS, 2.720 0.099 11.82 4,063 0.896 0.344 84.97 4,490
instrument hit−1
† The Hausman test statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-individual correlation.
§ The number of observations is smaller than the one in the benchmark models because not all the individuals reported the number of
desired working hours.
ror by using the variation in desired working hours to instrument the variation in working
hours ∆hit. Then, using a regression based Hausman test (robust to heteroskedasticity
and within-individual correlation), we tested whether the measurement error corrected
estimation of the parameter of contractual working hours is different from the one that
ignores the measurement error. Table 11 displays the Hausman test statistics. Since not
all the individuals reported the number of desired working hours, the number of obser-
vations is smaller than the one in the benchmark approach. The variation of the desired
working hours have a weak explanatory power in explaining ∆hit for men. However, it
is strong enough for women who, as said, might be more likely to report incorrectly their
contractual working hours. According to what we can infer from Table 11, it seems that
measurement error is not an issue.
Since in the LISS panel we also have information about individuals’ training activities
which are not sponsored by firms, we re-estimated all the baseline models by including
an indicator variable equal to one if the worker participated in a training course not spon-
sored by the firm in the last 12 months (and zero otherwise). Participation in other training
course is a time-varying variable which could be correlated to both the probability of firm-
sponsored training and working hours. Omitting this source of time-varying heterogeneity
might bias the estimation results. When we include the indicator for training not spon-
sored by the firm in the set of control variables, we get estimation results, significance
levels and diagnostic tests after 2SLS estimates that are indistinguishable from those of
the baseline models.15 Since the process of attending training courses not sponsored by
15The estimation results of the equations augmented by the indicator for training not sponsored by the
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the firm might be realized simultaneously to the process of receiving firm-sponsored train-
ing, we prefer to stick to the models without the indicator for training not sponsored by
the firm as a benchmark.
5.3 How to explain our findings
In the previous subsection, we showed that low working hours lower the chances of a
male worker to receive firm-sponsored training. For women, there is instead no effect
of working hours on firm-sponsored training. In this subsection, we try to answer the
question of why there is an effect for men but not for women.
As pointed out by Backes-Gellner et al. (2014), one of the most important determinant
of the firm propensity to provide their workers with training is the expected future work-
ing time volume of the match between the firm and a given worker. The larger the future
working time volume of the match, the higher indeed the probability that the employer
will recoup the training costs. As a matter of fact, Picchio and van Ours (2011) found that
the higher the degree of monopsony power, and thereby the lower the potential mobility
of workers, the higher the training investments of firms in the Netherlands. Ikenaga and
Kawaguchi (2013) studied the relationship between labor market attachment and training
participation in Japan, finding that workers’ expected attachment to the labor market and
expected tenure at a specific firm mainly explain participation in employer-provided train-
ing. Because of labor market imperfections employers may have some monopsony power
over workers. This allows them to reap some of the benefits of training by increase the
gap between productivity and wage (Acemoglu, 1997; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999). It
could be that our findings on the gender-specific relationship between part-time work and
firm-sponsored training are related to gender-specific monopsony power of firms. Indeed,
there is some evidence that employers have more monopsony power over female workers
than they have over male workers (Hirsch et al., 2010; Ransom and Oaxaca, 2010). If so,
this would make it more worthwhile for employers to invest in training of their female
workers. However, for a monopsony power explanation of our findings there should be
gender-working hours based differences in monopsony power.
Hence, one possible explanation for the gender difference in the effect is that the con-
tractual weekly working hours could be a better proxy of the stability of the job match for
men than for women. Being a man working little hours could mean that the male worker
is performing a bad job, a temporary situation, while for women working a reduced num-
ber of hours could be a permanent choice, a way to reconcile career and family care. We
firm are available from the authors upon request. We find that firm-sponsored training and training not
sponsored by the firm are negatively correlated for both men and women.
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test whether this might be an explanation of our findings by studying how the contractual
weekly working hours at time t affect the probability of leaving the current firm in the
subsequent 12 months. If working hours are a better predictor of expected job attachment
and job tenure for men than for women, this should be reflected in a larger positive ef-
fect of working part-time on the probability of leaving the current firm for men than for
women. The top panel of Table 12 reports the estimation results of a linear probability
model for leaving the current firm in one year as a function of contractual weekly working
hours and all the covariates used in the baseline model. We use different estimator and
report in bold the estimation results of the preferred models for men and women, chosen
on the basis of the 2SLS diagnostic tests. We conclude that a lower number of working
hours or having a part-time job is an indicator of short duration neither for men nor for
women.
As a further check in this direction, we studied the relation between working hours
and the probability of training not sponsored by the firm. If a part-time position is less
stable for men than for women, then male part-timers should more willing than female
part-timers to be involved in training activities not sponsored by the firm, so as to acquire
more general skills and be more likely to get a more stable position in some other firm.
The bottom panel of Table 12 reports the estimation results of a linear probability model
for training not sponsored by the firm as a function of contractual weekly working hours
and all the covariates used in the baseline model. We find no effect of contractual weekly
working hours on training not sponsored by the firm and no gender difference.
If the gender difference in the effect of working hours on firm-sponsored training is in-
duced by a different level of job stability between male and female part-timers, this might
be reflected on different levels of job satisfaction between men and women (conditional
on working hours). If the degree of job stability is decreasing in working hours for men,
then we should observe a positive relationship between male job satisfaction and working
hours. The LISS panel contains several variables measuring the employees’ satisfaction
from different angles: work, career, wage, working hours, work type and atmosphere with
colleagues satisfaction. The question about job satisfaction is specified as follows: “How
satisfied are you with [...]?” with the possible answers ranging in the set of positive in-
tegers from 0 (very dissatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied). We estimate thereby fixed effects
ordered logit models for these different measures of job related satisfaction to understand
whether and how they are affected by working hours. We use the fixed-effects ordered
logit estimator suggested by Mukherjee et al. (2008), named ‘blow-up and cluster’ (BUC)
by Baetschmann et al. (2015), who studied its properties and compared them to those of
alternative estimators. Table 13 reports the estimation results of the satisfaction equations
by gender and it shows that for men all the measures of job satisfaction are not affected
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TABLE 12: THE EFFECT OF CONTRACTUAL WEEKLY WORKING HOURS§ ON THE
PROBABILITY OF: A) LEAVING THE CURRENT FIRM IN ONE YEAR; B) TRAINING NOT
SPONSORED BY THE FIRM
Men Women
——————————————— ———————————————
Coeff. Std. Err. Observations Coeff. Std. Err. Observations
a) Dependent variable: Leaving the current job in one year
Levels OLS 0.00059 0.00069 6,128 0.00023 0.00034 6,776
First-difference OLS -0.00018 0.00353 4,565 -0.00394 ** 0.00194 5,034
First-difference 2SLS, instrument hit−1 0.00251 0.00649 4,565 0.00620 0.00476 5,034
Tests after 2SLS
F-test of excluded instruments 46.38 142.76
Hausman test of endogeneity F(1, 1467)=0.17 F(1, 1648)=4.69
p-value=0.681 p-value=0.031
b) Dependent variable: Training not sponsored by the firm
Levels OLS -0.00363 *** 0.00106 6,128 -0.00038 0.00047 6,776
First-difference OLS -0.00124 0.00365 4,565 0.00011 0.00159 5,034
First-difference 2SLS, instrument hit−1 -0.00790 0.00760 4,565 0.00053 0.00510 5,034
Tests after 2SLS
F-test of excluded instruments 46.47 142.66
Hausman test of endogeneity F(1, 1467)=1.12 F(1, 1648)=0.01
p-value=0.289 p-value=0.929
Notes: * Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation. We report in bold the estimation results of the referred models according to the diagnostic test after 2SLS estimation.
All the covariates of the baseline model plus the indicator for firm-sponsored training are included as regressors.
§ We also estimated similar models but using the part-time indicator as a measure of working hours. We obtained very similar results from
the qualitative viewpoint. They are not reported for the sake of brevity, but they are available from the authors upon request.
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by working hours. For women, we find instead some evidence of a significant and posi-
tive effect of working hours on wage satisfaction but a negative and significant effect on
working hours satisfaction.
Thereby, the explanation of why we find an effect of working hours on firm-sponsored
training for men but not for women does not seem to be linked to the actual job stability
of male and female part-timers. However, the time period over which we can compare
for example job stability is rather short. Therefore, we cannot rule out that there are
gender-working hours specific differences in monopsony power. Nevertheless, we spec-
ulate that our findings might also be related to social norms. We saw in Section 2 that in
the Netherlands for women it is quite common to work part-time. More than half of the
female prime age employees work part-time. Men working part-time are much less com-
mon in the Netherlands. The large gender difference in the share of men and women with
a part-time job might have shaped social norms according to which men working part-
time could send a very different signal to their employer than women working part-time.
The employer might interpret this preference as a signal of low attachment to the labor
market or low interest in that particular job, and thereby of short expected duration of the
job relationship. This might generate a different propensity of firms to sponsor training
of male part-timers than female part-timers. Since it is instead common for women to
choose part-time positions, the preference of a female worker for a reduced number of
working hours might not convey a bad signal to the employer. Gender asymmetries in
the type of signal sent by the preference for a reduced number of working hours might
thereby explain why we find a different propensity of firms to sponsor training of male
part-timers than that of female part-timers. Since we found no evidence of correlations
between working hours and future job stability and satisfaction, it might imply that social
norms are generating signals that do not reflect the actual attachment to the labor market
of male part-timers. If so, employers are allocating resources on training programs on the
basis of mis-perceived expected future working time volume of the match between the
firm and a given worker.
Finally, we investigate whether there are gender-specific differences in the part-time
pay penalty, i.e. in the hourly wages of part-timers and full-timers. The top panel of Table
14 shows the relevant parameter estimates when we relate contractual weekly working
hours to hourly wages. When using OLS we find for both men and women that the
hourly wage decreases with the number of working hours. In the bottom part of Table 14
we also find that part-timers have a higher hourly wage than full-timers. However, both
relationships may be caused by unobserved personal characteristics such that conditional
on observables more skillful individuals are more likely to have fewer working hours,
i.e. work part-time. Therefore, we also present estimates where we allow for individuals
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TABLE 13: FIXED-EFFECTS ORDERED LOGIT ESTIMATION† OF THE
EFFECT OF WORKING HOURS ON DIFFERENT MEASURES OF
WORK-RELATED SATISFACTION
Men Women
Dependent variables§ Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Effect of contractual weekly working hours on satisfaction
Work satisfaction -0.01000 0.01900 0.01060 0.01236
Career satisfaction -0.00778 0.01837 0.01844 0.01326
Wage satisfaction -0.01230 0.01960 0.02764 ** 0.01239
Working hours satisfaction 0.00046 0.02035 -0.03883 *** 0.01420
Work type satisfaction -0.01080 0.01933 0.00566 0.01419
Atmosphere with colleagues satisfaction -0.02963 0.02272 0.01118 0.01303
Effect of working part-time on satisfaction
Work satisfaction 0.25328 0.33100 -0.04021 0.17890
Career satisfaction 0.14641 0.37127 -0.06255 0.18632
Wage satisfaction 0.35435 0.34772 -0.09843 0.19153
Working hours satisfaction 0.15710 0.36357 0.43600 ** 0.20407
Work type satisfaction 0.41507 0.34905 0.08162 0.19361
Atmosphere with colleagues satisfaction 0.39625 0.47575 -0.23802 0.17249
Notes: * Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. The standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. All the covariates used in the baseline
model plus the indicator for firm-sponsored training are included as regressors in the equation for the
different measures of work-related satisfaction.
† We implement the ‘blow-up and cluster’ (BUC) fixed-effects ordered logit estimator suggested by
Mukherjee et al. (2008). We control also for all the covariates used in the baseline models in first-
differences.
§ The dependent variables take values on the set of integer values in [0, 10], where 0 means “not at all
satisfied” and 10 means “fully satisfied”.
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fixed effects. The parameter estimates are presented in the second rows of both the upper
and lower panel of Table 14. Now we find that for men the point estimates are very
much in line with those from the OLS estimator in levels: a Hausman test comparing
the levels OLS estimates with the first difference OLS estimates does not reject the null
hypothesis that working time is exogenous in the model in levels, when we use both the
contractual weekly working hours and the part-time indicator. For women, removing
the individual fixed effects by first differencing results instead in a significantly different
estimate of the parameter of the contractual weekly working hours.16 After looking also
at the Hausman test statistics comparing the first difference OLS estimates to the first
difference 2SLS estimate (with hit−1 as instrument for ∆hit), the preferred estimates are:
i) the levels OLS for men; ii) for women, the first difference 2SLS estimate when using
the contractual weekly working hours and the levels OLS estimate with the part-time
indicator. According to the preferred estimates, which are reported in bold in Table 14,
and if we take the hourly wage as an indicator of productivity, we conclude that part-
timers are more productive than full-timers, for both men and women.
We can only speculate on the reason for this. Perhaps the higher productivity of part-
timers is related to the combination of work and care. Studying the relationship between
hours of housework and hours of market work for partnered individuals of whom the man
works full-time Booth and van Ours (2013) conclude that for women increasing hours of
market work is not compensated by an equivalent reduction of hours of housework.17 As
the hours of market work of the women increase, man’s hours of housework remain almost
constant while for women there is approximately half an hour reduction of housework for
every additional hour of market work. So, the net increase of working hours for every
additional market hour is half an hour. Full-time working women may be less productive
than part-time working women because they have a lot of hours of housework to do. We
also note that, not only part-timers might be more productive than full-timers on an hourly
basis, but they could be more productive for firms on a weekly basis since they allow for
more organizational flexibility than full-timers (see Künn-Nelen et al., 2013).
16We computed the Hausman test statistics robust to heteroskedasticity and within-individual correlation
by bootstrapping 999 times the difference between the OLS and the first difference estimates of the param-
eter of the working time variable. For men the Hausman test statistic is χ2(1) = 0.147 (p-value = 0.701)
and χ2(1) = 0.187 (p-value = 0.666), respectively for the contractual weekly working hours variable and
the part-time dummy; for women we get χ2(1) = 4.265 (p-value = 0.039) and χ2(1) = 0.077 (p-value
= 0.781), respectively for the contractual weekly working hours variable and the part-time dummy.
17Housework includes preparation of lunch/dinner, making table ready for dinner, doing the dishes, vac-
uum cleaning, cleaning windows/doors, doing the floors, cleaning toilet/bathroom, waxing floor and clean-
ing furniture, cleaning the beds, washing clothes, drying clothes, ironing clothes, fixing clothes and watering
plants inside the house.
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TABLE 14: THE EFFECT OF WORKING HOURS ON THE LOG HOURLY WAGES
Men Women
——————————————— ———————————————
Coeff. Std. Err. Observations Coeff. Std. Err. Observations
Model Independent variable: contractual weekly working hours
Levels OLS -0.01116 *** 0.00235 5,319 -0.00780 *** 0.00113 5,958
First difference OLS -0.01457 0.01198 3,655 -0.01586 *** 0.00379 4,153
First-difference 2SLS, instrument hit−1 -0.00484 0.02229 3,655 -0.03447 * 0.01811 4,153
Tests after 2SLS
F-test of excluded instruments 41.51 127.00
Hausman test of endogeneity F(1, 1326)=1.68, p-value=0.195 F(1, 1494)=15.89, p-value=0.000
Hansen J statistics if lags of order 1 χ2(1)=1.07, p-value=0.301 χ2(1)=0.46, p-value=0.499
and 2 are jointly used as instruments
Model Independent variable: part-time indicator
Levels OLS 0.18762 *** 0.04592 5,319 0.10042 *** 0.01630 5,958
First difference OLS 0.26403 0.19377 3,655 0.11674 ** 0.05702 4,153
First-difference 2SLS, instrument hit−1 0.30654 0.32791 3,655 0.48957 *** 0.22599 4,153
Tests after 2SLS
F-test of excluded instruments 24.70 157.18
Hausman test of endogeneity F(1, 1326)=1.85, p-value=0.174 F(1, 1494)=3.01, p-value=0.083
Hansen J statistics if lags of order 1 χ2(1)=0.72, p-value=0.398 χ2(1)=0.026, p-value=0.872
and 2 are jointly used as instruments
Notes: * Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation. We report in bold the estimation results of the preferred models according to the diagnostic tests after 2SLS estimation.
We include in the log hourly wage equation all the covariates used in the baseline model plus an indicator for firm-sponsored training. We
lose observations compared to the benchmark estimates because not all the workers report the monthly income, which is used to compute
the average hourly wage, and because we exclude those individuals who worked zero hours in the month of the survey interview.
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6 Conclusions
Using longitudinal data on workers in the Netherlands and focusing on the differences
between males and females, we study the effect of working hours on the propensity of
firms to sponsor training of their employees. On average, both part-time working men
and part-time working women are less likely to receive firm-sponsored training than their
full-time working counterparts. This is still the case if we allow for observed personal
characteristics to influence the probability to receive firm-sponsored training. However,
once we account for differences in unobserved personal characteristics we no longer find
that part-time working women receive less firm-sponsored training than full-time working
women. Apparently, for women the part-time specific difference in the likelihood of
receiving training is related to unobserved characteristics and not to the working hours.
For men, allowing for differences in unobserved characteristics does not remove the part-
time training penalty. Allowing for potential endogeneity of working part-time we still
find a difference in training propensity between part-time and full-time working men but
no such difference for women. In this respect our findings are similar to what Backes-
Gellner et al. (2014) find for Switzerland. However, different from the Swiss study we do
not find a gender-specific difference in training incidence for full-time workers.
We investigate several possible explanations for the gender-specific differences in the
part-time training penalty. We study whether they are related to gender-specific type of
work by investigating whether unobserved firm differences matter but find that this is
not the case. We also investigate whether job stability is an issue. If part-time working
men are less likely to stay at a firm while part-time working women stay longer it does
not pay for firms to make a training investment in part-time working men. We find no
evidence for this. We also find no differences in job satisfaction between part-timers and
full-timers. All this suggests that differences in monopsony power over part-time working
men or part-time working men are not relevant. However, the time period over which we
can compare, for example, job stability is rather short. Therefore, we cannot rule out that
there are gender-working hours specific differences in monopsony power. Nevertheless,
we speculate that the reason for part-time working women to be as likely to receive firm-
sponsored training as full-time working women is related to social norms. Whereas in
the Netherlands working part-time is well-established for women, this is less common for
men. Employers interpret a man working part-time as signaling a lower attachment to the
job. We find no evidence that, at least in the short run, this is the case. It could be that
employers are allocating resources on training programs on the basis of mis-perceived
expected future working time volume of the match between the firm and a given worker.
This opens the door to the intervention of the policy maker, which could aim at weakening
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the influence of social norms on employers’ training decision-making.
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